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Abstract 
 
 The Battle of Beersheba, fought on October 31, 1917, was a vital turning point in the 
British campaign against the Ottoman Turks. The battle opened a gap in the Turkish line 
that eventually resulted in the British takeover of Palestine. The British command saw the 
cavalry charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade as a new tactical opportunity, and this fac-
tored into the initiative for new light tank forces designed around the concepts of mobility 
and flanking movements. What these commanders failed to realize was that the Palestine 
Campaign was an anachronistic theater of war in comparison to the rest of the Great War. 
The charge of the 4th Light Horse, while courageous and vital to the success of the Battle 
of Beersheba, also owed its success to a confluence of advantageous circumstances, 
which the British command failed to take into account when designing their light tank 
forces prior to World War II. 
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The Battle of Beersheba: Strategic and Tactical Pivot of Palestine 
World War I has taken its place in the public perception as a trench war, a conflict 
of brutal struggle between industrial powers that heaped up dead and wounded and for-
ever changed Europe’s consciousness. However, the war also involved campaigns which, 
though peripheral to the famous Western Front, nonetheless had an impact on the powers 
involved and the destiny of the regions in which they occurred. The Palestine Campaign, 
fought between the British and the Ottoman Empire in the ancient setting of the Holy 
Land, was one of these campaigns. While not decisive to the course of the war, this series 
of engagements in 1917 and 1918 charted the course of modern Middle Eastern history 
and provided a showcase for almost anachronistic military tactics and battles. The Battle 
of Beersheba on October 31, 1917 was a small part of a much larger action by British 
General Sir Edmund Allenby, and played an integral part in the success of British strat-
egy in this campaign, as well as forming a part of a series of cavalry actions that influ-
enced later British tactical doctrine. In taking this small town through a dramatic cavalry 
charge, the Australian Light Horse not only cemented their place in the annals of military 
legend, but also served as the point of a massive assault that Allenby used to roll up the 
Turkish line and take Palestine. The Battle of Beersheba was the key tipping point of the 
British campaign in Palestine, and the charge of the Australian Light Horse would later 
have a large impact on the British military extending into the Second World War. 
With the war on the Western Front bogged down in the horrors of trench warfare, 
the British government felt the need to open a new front, both to boost morale at home 
and to open new strategic possibilities.1 The Germans had been able to bring the Turks 
                                                 
1. Eitan Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-
18,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 1 (January 2001): 90. 
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into the war, which was an early diplomatic defeat for the British, who historically were 
interested in maintaining the Ottomans as a stable buffer state.2 Once the Turks became 
belligerents, Prime Minister David Lloyd George became convinced that British domi-
nance over a destroyed Ottoman Empire's territory in the Middle East was essential to 
crafting a colonial empire after the end of the Great War.3 By 1917, the British were fac-
ing an altered situation, up against steep odds with the recent Revolution hampering Rus-
sia’s ability to contribute to the war effort. Lloyd George needed a new strategy to sal-
vage something from the conflict.4 There were other considerations as well: British strat-
egists sought to eliminate the vulnerability of the Suez Canal as well as secure British 
access to Middle Eastern oil.5 Beyond these local strategic functions, Lloyd George had 
long believed in the viability of a southern attack on Turkey, and hoped that the Palestine 
Campaign could offer him his opportunity.6 The Palestine Campaign also offered a vital 
                                                 
2. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1963), 23. Monroe states, “For a century, foreign thrusts towards India had been parried by a policy 
of keeping the Ottoman Empire whole, and using Turkish Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan as a glacis which 
Britain did not want to occupy, but could not afford to see occupied by an enemy. With the entry of the 
Young Turks into the war, the first became enemy territory and the road to the other two lay open to sub-
versive agents. The change was fundamental, and produced a quick succession of political and military 
reflexes” (24). 
3. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of 
the Modern Middle East (New York: H. Holt, 2001), 301. 
4. Brock Millman, “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (April 2001): 253-254. Millman details, “...A grand strategy began to de-
velop, in furtherance of the new vision which advocated a movement to peripheral warfare as a conces-
sion to an altered reality, as a way of putting Britain in a position to participate in a peace conference, and 
of gaining those contingent and instrumental war aims which would have to be salvaged from what would 
be, essentially, an Entente defeat” (253-254). 
5. Nigel Steel, “'The Great Ride’: Romani to Damascus,” in Lawrence of Arabia and the Light 
Horse, ed. Robert Nichols (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 2007), 2. 
6. Fromkin, 265. According to Fromkin, “From the beginning of the war, Lloyd George had ar-
gued that Germany could be beaten by an attack through the Balkans. Defeating Turkey would open up the 
Balkans to such an attack.” 
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morale component to the British government, at a time when military and propaganda 
successes were increasingly difficult to find.7  
While later British strategy and diplomacy in the Middle East would become a 
hopeless morass of conflicting goals and confusion, the early stages of the Palestine 
Campaign presented the clear and definable goals Lloyd George desired. From its posi-
tion at the base of the Palestine region, the British wanted to drive north, pushing the 
Turks back and claiming Jerusalem.8 In combination with this drive, a propaganda cam-
paign on the home front would “...convey two principal messages: the immutable barba-
rism of the Turk and the illegitimate and destructive nature of his empire.”9 The British 
portrayed their entry into the Middle East as a liberation of those under Ottoman control 
and made diplomatic promises to a number of peoples, mainly Arab, which they ended up 
unable to keep.10 
The British gave the challenge of invading Palestine to General Edmund Allenby, 
a cavalry general fresh from the Western Front. Allenby was a personal, hands-on com-
mander who seemed perfect for a task that required definite, newsworthy results to raise 
morale.11 According to David Fromkin, “Allenby's commission from the Prime Minister 
                                                 
7. Millman, 249; Bar-Yosef, 90. 
8. Monroe, 38. He states, “The prospect of a British capture of the Holy Land appealed to Lloyd 
George as a man of religious upbringing, a romantic and a citizen of the British Empire.” 
9. James Renton, “Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the 
Middle East, 1917-1918,” The Historical Journal 50, no. 3 (2007): 648.  
10. Ibid., 652. Renton argues that “...The British government sought to portray the advance of 
British imperial troops into the Orient as a war of liberation for Zionism, Arab, and Armenian nationalism”; 
Millman, 261 and 270. 
11. David Bullock, Allenby's War: the Palestine-Arabian Campaign, 1916-1918 (London: Bland-
ford Press, 1988), 66; Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness (London: George G. Harrap and 
Co., 1941), 190, 198.  
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was to invade and occupy Palestine and to take Jerusalem before Christmas.”12 The situa-
tion when Allenby took over from the previous commander of the Egyptian Expedition-
ary Force, General Sir Archibald Murray, was less than promising. The British had al-
ready fought two engagements at Gaza, without much success.13 In fact, these attacks had 
proved successively more dismal, the first ending in a retreat just before objectives were 
reached due to lack of water, and the second faltering early against the Turks who held 
excellent positions.14 These attacks involved “a frontal ‘Western Front’ type of assault” 
according to Yigal Sheffy, and even included a gas bombardment during the Second Bat-
tle of Gaza.15 In these battles British commanders utilized their cavalry elements as 
mounted riflemen, dismounting them when they came into contact with the enemy as per 
the prevailing doctrine of the day.16 British forces would later employ more traditional 
cavalry tactics at Beersheba.  
When Allenby took command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, he immedi-
ately set in motion changes that infused life into a tired force.17 Lieutenant General Philip 
Chetwode had already developed a plan for a new British offensive, and Allenby quickly 
                                                 
12. Fromkin, 308.  
13. Wavell, 188-189. 
14. Steel, 6. 
15. Yigal Sheffy, “Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918,” The Journal of 
Military History 73, no. 3 (July 2009): 814, 819. 
16. G.W. Nutting, History of the Fourth Light Horse Brigade, Australian Imperial Forces, War 
1914-1918 and Egyptian Rebellion 1919 (Kemp Place Valley: W.R. Smith and Paterson, 1953), 28-29, 
Australian Light Horse Studies Centre. 
17. Wavell, 190. 
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adopted it.18 With the southernmost Turkish line stretched from Gaza in the west along to 
coast to Beersheba in the east, Chetwode recommended an elaborate double feint of sorts: 
a surprise attack against Beersheba concealed by a false buildup at Gaza, then followed 
up by an actual attack at Gaza once the Turkish left crumpled.19 In a way, this strategy 
can be seen as the culmination of the British command’s apparent fascination with flank-
ing and hook maneuvers, which they also employed in local tactics utilized at Beer-
sheba.20 Allenby began to make tours of the front and involved himself directly in prepa-
rations for the campaign.21 According to Wavell, “The plan itself was simple...to concen-
trate a superior force against the enemy's left flank [Beersheba], while inducing him to 
believe that his right [Gaza] would again be attacked.”22 In execution, however, the op-
eration involved elaborate maneuvers and immense amounts of manpower, all in order to 
deceive the Turkish and German commanders who faced Allenby in the desert.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18. Robyn Van-Dyk, “The Charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade at Beersheba,” Australian War 
Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/blog/2007/10/30/the-charge-of-the-4th-light-horse-brigade-at-
beersheba/ (accessed June 26, 2012). 
19. Roger Ford, Eden to Armageddon: World War I in the Middle East (New York: Pegasus 
Books, 2010), 332; Wavell, 191, 201 and 208. 
20. Bruce Gudmundsson, “Allenby's Turning Tactics,” The Quarterly Journal of Military History 
19, no. 4 (Summer 2007): 80. The author notes the tactical flanking maneuvers that would be used at Beer-
sheba itself, but the principle seems to hold for the larger strategy Allenby and Chetwode developed, as 
they planned to break and turn the Turkish flank before assaulting Gaza. 
21. Wavell, 198. 
22. Ibid., 201. 
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Figure 1.23 
Internal issues, including high percentages of deserters, low unit cohesion and 
morale, and rampant disease, plagued the predominantly Turkish force holding Pales-
                                                 
23. From the Australian War Memorial. Situation map of the area on October 30, 1917. 
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tine.24 Another factor that made for difficulties was the competition and problems be-
tween the Turkish Army proper and their German allies. The German role on the Turkish 
front was quickly becoming that of plugging all the gaps and trying to push the Turks to 
make a cohesive stand.25 No doubt partially due to these troubles, the Ottomans and their 
German allies were under no illusions as to the delicacy of their position. They “...fully 
expected Allenby's offensive, and believed the blow would fall late in October or early in 
November [1917].”26 Allenby was assaulting a prepared enemy across difficult terrain, 
and would need to employ decisive action and careful deception to succeed. 
 Of vital importance to Allenby’s movement against the Turkish flank was logisti-
cal and counterintelligence preparation. Simply from a logistical perspective, the maneu-
ver presented a number of problems. Allenby shifted pack animals to the Beersheba flank 
because of the difficult terrain, which prevented the use of mechanized units there.27 In 
fact, this terrain would prove so adaptable to mounted tactics as to provide an almost 
anachronistically ideal battleground for the work of cavalry. In order to support the battle 
plan he had in mind, Allenby’s engineers worked to establish forward supply dumps of 
water and reopen cisterns that had been blocked by the Turks, all in an attempt to secure 
sufficient water supply for the movements of the British units across the desert.28 The or-
der of battle directed that “[Lieutenant General Sir Edward] Bulfin’s 21st Corps was to 
                                                 
24. Bullock, 69. This was so bad that “...One-quarter, or 10,000, of the whole army personnel was 
sick in hospital at any given time.” 
25. Ibid., 71. 
26. H.S. Gullet, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914-1918 (Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson, 1923), 372. 
27. Bullock, 67.  
28. Gullet, 378-379. 
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direct a holding action against Gaza while [General Sir Henry] Chauvel’s Desert Mount-
ed Corps and Chetwode’s 20th Corps delivered the master stroke to the Turkish left….”29  
Allenby had good reason to choose Beersheba specifically as the target of his as-
sault on the Turks’ left flank. A small town on the eastern end of the Turkish position, 
“Beersheba was a locally significant junction of road and track...but it was the wells that 
were most critical to the game plan.”30 The problems involved in this assault were the 
difficulties of transporting the force over poor roads and supplying them with water, es-
pecially the horses of the mounted units. As a result, Wavell notes that “The early capture 
of the Turkish detached force at Beersheba, with wells intact if possible, was...a keystone 
of the plan.”31 As part of the intense preparation for the attack, engineers rediscovered 
and readied wells at Khalasa and Asluj, making possible some of the difficult maneuvers 
Allenby had in mind.32 This was vitally necessary as “Man and beast would require a dai-
ly 400,000 gallons [of water] in the 30th Corps and Desert Mounted Corps alone.”33 With 
water such a key part of any strategic or logistical discussion in desert warfare, it even 
dictated Allenby’s tactics. The orders issued to the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade 
included specific directions to hit the Turks from behind and capture the wells at Beer-
sheba “…In order to form a base for future operations Northwards.”34  
                                                 
29. Bullock, 73.  
30. Ibid., 74. 
31. Wavell, 201. 
32. Nutting, 25. Van-Dyk also mentions this issue: “The greatest problem for Chauvel was to find 
sufficient water in the Beersheba area for his mounted troops... At Asluj the old wells were found and a 
fortnight’s work put them into working order. This made the attack on Beersheba a feasible operation.”  
33. Bullock, 67. 
34. W. Grant, “Brigade Operation Order No. 37,” October 30, 1917, in 4th Australian Light Horse 
Brigade War Diary, October 1917, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 40-41. 
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Allenby’s command put immense effort into concealing the true nature of their 
plans and maneuvers from the Turks, both in selling the feint at Gaza and hiding the 
buildup at Beersheba.35 This subterfuge consisted of a concerted counter-intelligence 
campaign that aimed to fix the Turkish commanders’ attention on Gaza, where they had 
previously defended against two unsuccessful British attacks, while simultaneously mov-
ing a large force undetected into position at Beersheba, the opposite end of the front lines. 
A daring counterintelligence action helped to conceal the true intentions of the British. It 
originated with one Col. JD Belgrave, and was actually carried out by Capt. ACB Neate, 
who rode up towards Turkish lines, faked a wound, and pretended to accidentally drop a 
bag stuffed with false orders and maps, all for the enemy’s benefit.36 The British also 
maintained the ruse by a large-scale artillery bombardment of Gaza in the days leading up 
to the British strike at Beersheba.37 Finally, the arrival of the new British Bristol fighter 
aircraft took air dominance away from the German air force in Palestine, giving Allenby 
the crucial ability to maintain a counterintelligence smokescreen working while he shuf-
fled troops around just out of view of the enemy.38 
The result of this excellent deception was that the Turks and their German allies 
remained convinced that the previous British attacks at Gaza were being repeated, even 
as evidence began to trickle in to the contrary.39 H.S. Gullett summarizes the situation 
                                                 
35. Gullett, 372-375. 
36. Fromkin, 311; Ford, 338, 464. 
37. Steel, 6. Ford elaborates: “Surprise would be of the essence, of course, and it would be vital to 
mount a diversionary operation designed to convince the Turks that the British were willing to batter them-
selves senseless against Gaza city once more” (332). 
38. Ibid., 336. 
39. Ford, 338. He goes on to note that “It is clear that by 28 October Kressenstein's staff was well 
informed as to the build-up; it was at that point that the effects of the ‘haversack’ ruse...were felt, the Ger-
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excellently when he notes that while “The enemy fully expected Allenby’s offensive, and 
believed the blow would fall late in October or early in November,” it was simultane-
ously true that “Neither [the Turkish leader] nor the German leaders believed it was pos-
sible for Allenby to fling his chief strength on the Beersheba flank.”40 Through his care-
ful planning and the cunning of his intelligence team, Allenby had gained the element of 
surprise, and now he simply had to exploit his advantage. 
This task fell to the mounted troopers of the Australian Light Horse. The ALH 
was originally organized as a mounted rifle unit rather than a true shock cavalry force. 
These hardy riders, used to conditions in Australia, were perfectly suited to the harsh ter-
rain, open spaces, and mobile combat of the deserts of Palestine.41 Formed in the early 
days of the war and disbanded shortly after its end, they seemed perfectly placed in en-
gagements that would capture the imagination of the British home front.42 After the Brit-
ish defeat at Gallipoli, the ALH were combined with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles to 
form the ANZACS, and placed under the command of Lieutenant General Harry Chau-
vel.43 Unlike some of their other mounted counterparts, the ALH was armed with infantry 
weapons only and did without the additional cavalry saber that some other mounted units 
in the theater were equipped with.44 Peter Burness notes, “The light horse was not meant 
                                                                                                                                                 
man commander persisting in the belief that what he was seeing was a feint aimed at drawing his attention 
away from Gaza.”  
40. Gullett, 372 and 373. 
41. Peter Burness, “The Australian Light Horse,” in Lawrence of Arabia and the Light Horse, ed. 
Robert Nichols (Canberra: The Australian War Memorial, 2007), 12 and16.  
42. Ibid., 21. “The Australian Light Horse existed for less than 50 years, through peace and war.” 
43. Steel, 4-5. 
44. C. Falls, G. MacMunn, and A.F. Becke, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine (London, 
H.M. Stationary Office, 1930), 57-58, Australian Light Horse Studies Centre. 
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to fight from horseback with sword or lance as cavalry did. The light horseman’s mount 
gave him mobility, but in action he would dismount to fight on foot; in battle one man in 
four was usually required to be a horse-holder.”45 However, even though they tended to 
receive less glamorous assignments than their military ancestors, Burness records that  
Australians saw their light horsemen as an elite. Even in drab wartime dress there 
was an air of dash and glamour about them. In stereotype at least, they combined 
the qualities of the rural pioneer with those of the natural soldier. There was per-
haps some substance to this romantic view. Drawn heavily from the country 
towns and properties, where ownership of a horse and the ability to ride demon-
strated that a man was both fit and solvent, light horsemen were considered to 
possess hardiness, independence, and initiative.46 
 
These qualities would soon serve these horsemen well, as they would be called upon to 
serve in an uncharacteristic and vital role in the coming battle. 
With the preliminary ruse complete, a similar deception occurred at the tactical 
level near Beersheba. The basic plan was to send the 20th Corps forward against Beer-
sheba while looping the Desert Mounted Corps to the rear.47 The 20th Infantry was to 
capture the actual garrison through a frontal assault, while the Desert Mounted Corps, 
which included the Australian Light Horse, would take the town and vital water supply.48 
The Brigade Orders for the attack note “Tasks for the Desert Mounted Corps are (a) at-
tack Beersheba from the East so as to envelop the enemy’s left rear and (b) seize as much 
water supply as possible in order to form a base for future operations Northwards.”49 In 
short, Allenby planned a classic flanking maneuver, in the hopes that the inexperienced 
                                                 
45. Burness, 12. 
46. Ibid.,12. 
47. Bullock, 75. 
48. Wavell, 211. 
49. Grant, “Brigade Operation Order,” 40-41. 
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Turkish troops would be surprised by the appearance of the mounted troops from the east. 
In his summary of the battle, Robyn Van-Dyk lists the odds: “Beersheba’s defences were 
held by 1,000 Turkish riflemen, nine machine guns and two aircraft...on the night of 30 
October about 40,000 allied troops moved towards Beersheba….”50 Allenby wanted vic-
tory, and was willing to commit disproportionate force to get it. 
With their objectives set, the British troops began moving into position on Octo-
ber 30, 1917. As noted by C. Falls, G. MacMunn, and A.F. Becke in their campaign his-
tory, “The marches before the mounted troops were therefore long. That of the A. & N.Z. 
Mounted Division from Asluj to Bir el Hamam was 24 miles, that of the Australian 
Mounted Division from Khelasa through Asluj to Iswaiwin 30 miles, that of the 7th 
Mounted Brigade about 17 miles.”51 The British command was aware of the dangers of 
losing the element of surprise or of artillery and air attacks breaking up the mounted col-
umns; therefore, they gave specific instructions on how to deal with these threats. These 
included strict light discipline and bans on smoking, as well as order against officers car-
rying sensitive information and maps with them while on march.52 After they arrived at 
their objectives on the morning of the 31st, the Turkish commander of the garrison, Ismet 
Bey, was shocked “...By the appearance of two cavalry divisions to the east, not having 
contemplated that the British mounted troops would move, at any rate in such numbers, 
                                                 
50. Van-Dyk. Bullock sums up: “Irresistible force was now in position...the EEF thus possessed 
twice the infantry, nine times the calvary, and three gun for every two Turkish guns, generally throughout 
the battle line. The concentration, however, had made the threat against Beersheba far worse...a total ratio 
advantage of eight to one” (73). 
51. Falls, MacMunn and Becke, 52-53. 
52. Grant, “Brigade Operation Order,” 40-41. 
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so far from water.”53 Kress von Kressenstein, the German commander in communication 
with Bey, later noted that the Turks had sighted the British mounted troops with aerial 
scouts as well as through intelligence, and states that Bey attempted to reallocate his own 
cavalry forces to deal with this new threat.54  In many ways, Kressenstein’s account of 
the battle reads like a man’s attempt to shift blame for a catastrophe onto a subordinate, 
but the reality was that neither the Turks nor the Germans had realized what was actually 
going on until it was far too late to do anything about it. 
Bey had little time to properly deal with the mounted troops his garrison had 
sighted in the hills to his flank, but by now the main British attack was fully underway. 
Chetwode's infantry opened the battle with an artillery bombardment, intended to break 
up the barbed wire in front of the Turkish trenches and to further fix their attention on the 
infantry attack.55 Quickly realizing that he was about to come under heavy attack and his 
position was untenable, Bey urgently requested reinforcements from Kressenstein. How-
ever, the German commander had completely fallen for the deception and expected a full 
scale attack at Gaza, especially since the British had been bombarding the city steadily to 
maintain the ruse.56 The Turks were stranded and under assault.  
                                                 
53. Falls, MacMunn and Becke, 54. 
54. Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal (Berlin: Otto 
Schleigel, 1938), 277, Australian Light Horse Studies Centre. 
55. Gullett, 386. 
56. Falls, MacMunn and Becke, 54; Bullock, 75. 
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Figure 2.57 
The 20th Corps began their attack, in concert with some of the ALH and other 
mounted units, who were as usual utilized as mounted riflemen.58 While most of their 
                                                 
57. From Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Beersheba_map.png. 
Detail of movements at the last stage of the battle.  
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movements met with quick success, they had difficulty taking Tel el Saba, a hilltop that 
the Turks held with a small garrison and a machine gun detachment. This small force 
stubbornly held out until the British finally regrouped and took the hill.59 However, the 
British were not in full possession of Tel el Saba until about 3 p.m. that day, and this de-
lay would have crucial effects on the rest of the battle.60 
Kressenstein attempted to explain Ismet Bey’s actions during the battle, and the 
story he teld is one of a desperate commander making every effort to save a doomed posi-
tion. Kressenstein detailed: 
 Ismed sent the Cavalry Division to the heights northeast of Beersheba with orders 
to prevent an encirclement of Beersheba by the enemy Light Horsemen. One of 
those many conical hills in this region, Tel el Saba, controlled the surrounding ar-
ea but was inadequately held so Ismed had it occupied by a battalion consisting of 
300 rifles and 6 heavy machine guns. With two battalions of the remaining re-
serves, he moved quickly to close the broad, five kilometre gap between the left 
wing of his prepared position at Tel el Saba and Ras Ghannam.61 
 
Other sources make clear that the Turkish cavalry were actually able to prevent the Aus-
tralian Light Horse units from completely surrounding Beersheba. This had been done 
early on the 31st, when Bey first realized that he was about to be completely flanked by 
enemy cavalry.62 As the day wore on, the Light Horse units to the southeast of Beersheba 
                                                                                                                                                 
58. Falls, MacMunn and Becke, 56-57. 
59. Kressenstein, 278. He further recounts: “…During the morning, with some assistance, the New 
Zealand brigade commenced a frontal assault against Tell el Saba. The open area provided no cover which 
allowed the Turkish machine gun fire to bring the attack to a stand still. Only after the English employed 
fresh forces and developed a comprehensive attack against both the north and south flanks of Tel el Saba, 
they succeeded in taking by storm the Turkish position at 3 pm. The under strength Turkish battalion en-
trusted with its defence doggedly held out with great courage and in so doing fulfilled its obligation.” 
60. Alexander Kearsey, A Summary of the Strategy and Tactics of the Egypt and Palestine Cam-
paign, with Details of the 1917-18 Operations Illustrating the Principles of War (Aldershot: Gale & Pol-
den, 1931), 21, Australian Light Horse Studies Centre. 
61. Kressenstein, 277. 
62. Falls, MacMunn and Becke, 56. 
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took cover in the foothills to avoid Turkish shells lobbed in their direction.63 In other 
words, the Turks had done the best with what they had, bravely defending their positions 
in the face of overwhelming numbers. However, by 3 p.m., with Tel el Saba finally in 
British hands and dusk falling, the situation was becoming critical for the British units as 
their timetable quickly eroded. It was at this point that the Australian Light Horse was 
called upon to step into the gap and take its place in military history. 
With daylight fading fast and the mission’s main operational objectives, the criti-
cal wells at the center of the town, still untaken, British command needed a solution that 
would bring a quick and decisive end to the battle.64 Their answer, paradoxically in this 
war of the machine gun and the barbed-wire no-man’s-land, was a cavalry charge. After 
waiting for hours through the day and enduring both shelling and intermittent bombing 
by the few planes the Turks possessed, General William Grant, commander of the 4th 
ALH, ordered the Australians into the saddle.65 General Grant ordered his 12th Regiment: 
“Use your bayonets as swords. I wish you the best of luck.”66 Improperly armed for the 
maneuver, and executing an attack which was counter to the prevailing military wisdom 
of the day and to their experience during the campaign to that point, “...Around 800 light 
                                                 
63. Van-Dyk. The author quotes one Private Hunter, who later stated “The Turks immediately 
started shelling us with heavies. Good cover and tact on our part prevented casualties.” 
64. W. Grant, “Report on Operations (Attack on Beersheba),” November 2, 1917, in 4th Austra-
lian Light Horse Brigade War Diary, October 1917, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 45-47. “It was 
essential that the place be taken quickly, as the horses had not been watered since the previous day and had 
made a night march of over 30 miles.”; Ion Llewellyn Idriess, The Desert Column: Leaves from the Diary 
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horsemen moved forward in line. Over the final two kilometres they charged at full 
speed, smashing into and through the Turkish trenches.”67 
As they charged, a Turkish machine gun position opened fire in enfilade, but a 
supporting British artillery unit quickly returned fire and silenced the Turkish guns.68 
Meanwhile, Turkish artillery and riflemen from the trenches opened fire, but were unable 
to stop the charge, and the British units swept through the Turkish trench line and into 
Beersheba. According to the Kearsey account,  
[t]heir forward squadrons galloped over the two front lines of trenches, then dis-
mounted and attacked the occupants with the bayonet. The remainder of the Bri-
gade galloped into the town and captured 1,100 prisoners and ten guns of the 
Turkish 27th Division. Also they prevented the Turks from destroying more than 
two of the seventeen wells in the town. The 4th A.L.H. Brigade lost 31 killed and 
33 wounded.69 
 
In a single swift action, a daring and high-risk cavalry charge into the teeth of a defended 
trench line effectively won the battle. The British were in possession of the town, had 
eliminated the garrison from action, and were now in control of one end of the Turkish 
line, exactly the situation Allenby needed. Importantly, they also controlled the vital 
wells and were now in a position to press their advantage. Beersheba had gone largely 
according to plan, a definite rarity in battle. 
The report on the battle issued by the 4th ALH Brigade noted that “All ranks be-
haved in a most admirable manner and fearlessly charged several successive trenches at 
the gallop, in many cases in the face of severe machine gun and rifle fire. The rapidity of 
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the attack seemed to demoralize the Turks and also avoided their artillery fire.”70 Their 
assault had not only taken the town, but had also opened the door for Allenby’s success-
ful advance to Jerusalem. As G.W. Nutting puts it, “[t]he fall of Beersheba commenced 
the rout which ended in driving the Turks out of Palestine...the flank of the Turkish Army 
turned.”71 The success was not complete: later events prevented Allenby from immedi-
ately following up his initial advantage, plagued again by the crucial water issues even 
after the capture of the Beersheba wells. Nevertheless, the crucial gap in the line had been 
opened, and from this point forward in the campaign, the Turks would be on the defen-
sive. The campaign was certainly not won at Beersheba, but it was a crucial hinge on 
which the tide of battle turned in the favor of the British.72 
Speaking in strategic terms, Beersheba created a vital crack in the Turkish de-
fenses that enabled Allenby to eventually roll up their flank and push his way north. 
While this movement was neither immediate nor uncontested, the eventual result of the 
campaign was British victory, with the Ottoman Turks driven from Palestine.73 Kearsey’s 
account sums up the battle’s place in the campaign by stating “This preliminary operation 
was thus completely successful owing to the fact that the Turks were surprised, and that 
the final assault was carried through with great determination and rapidity.”74 British vic-
tory here was much more than a sideshow to the Great War, however. As Roger Ford 
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notes, “…With the Americans on whom the British and French pinned so many of their 
hopes proving very slow off the mark, and with the collapse of the Eastern front…Lloyd 
George badly needed a hat, and a rabbit to pull from it. The hat was the Middle East, and 
the rabbit was the defeat of the Turks in Palestine.”75 In addition, the events of this cam-
paign, especially the famous charge of the Light Horse, would have an important impact 
on events leading up to the next World War. 
The most important effect of the Light Horse’s dashing charge, for better or for 
worse, was to force the British command to reassess their evolving tactical doctrine re-
garding mounted troops.76 During World War I, there had been an active debate raging as 
to what role cavalry, in the sense of a classic sword-armed horseman, would be able to 
play on a battlefield dominated by innovations such as the trench warfare, barbed wire 
emplacements, and machine guns.77 While previously, the prevailing notion had been that 
modern war technology had made the pure cavalry unit obsolete, success at Beersheba 
led some to revisit this problem and even argue that cavalry could make a comeback.78 
With this question in mind, military men and scholars since the war have long debated 
the significance of the ALH’s cavalry charge, seeking to establish exactly why it was 
successful and how that experience should apply to tactical doctrine. 
Further probing into the famous charge reveals that, while certainly a decisive and 
brave action, it depended on many less glamorous actions and conditions for its success. 
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In the first place, the Turkish defenders may have contributed through poor training and 
preparation to their own downfall. Several eyewitnesses, as well as the 4th ALH Brigade’s 
official report on the battle, state that the British troops discovered Turkish artillery and 
rifles with their elevation sights fully set. This indicated that perhaps the Turkish troops, 
poorly trained and under the effects of an intimidating cavalry assault, failed to adjust 
their sights and were therefore firing above the heads of the horsemen as they charged.79 
Indeed, contemporary analysts placed much stock in the effects that the charge had had 
on the Turkish defenders, as in Hector Dinning’s statement that “In the face of a body of 
galloping swords the bravest will falter and break, where, rationally, there is no excuse 
for it. The cavalry charge is the chief of all forms of Bluff in warfare.”80 Other sources 
also use the term bluff, including a German Staff Officer who claimed that the troops de-
fending Beersheba were shocked that the British followed through with the charge, think-
ing it a bluff maneuver.81 And of course, the supporting fire from the British gunners was 
vital to keeping the charge from being enfiladed with machine gun fire as well. But an-
other, perhaps even more vital detail, emerges from the sources: the Turks failed to con-
struct barbed wire defenses in front of their trenches. Subsequent commentators agree 
with Jean Bou on this point: “Had the Turkish defenses at Beersheba been wired, the 
charge by the 4th Light Horse Brigade could not have taken place.”82  
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All of these factors aided the spectacular success of the charge, but it seems that 
the British command paid less attention to the contributing circumstances than to the 
overall effect, which distorted their final interpretation. In fact, this shift in thinking had 
begun even before the close of the campaign, as British commanders began allowing their 
mounted units to engage in classic cavalry charges, steel in hand, when the situation al-
lowed an opportunity.83 British reassessment of the usefulness of cavalry tactics would 
continue into the interwar period, with fateful results for the effectiveness of British ar-
mored units. 
The period between the World Wars saw a British military establishment attempt-
ing to make sense of the bewildering array of technological and tactical advances which 
had shown themselves in the last conflict, while simultaneously attempting to predict the 
nature of the next. In this way they were similar to the other great powers, who each were 
attempting to develop their own strategic and tactical answers to these new dilemmas. For 
the British military, this process was an evolutionary one, the product of argumentation 
and exchange between “a group of dedicated activists” that included theorists J.F. Fuller 
and Basil Liddell Hart.84 These theories took many forms, based on the ideological de-
velopment of the various theorists as well as the relative importance they placed on the 
armored vehicle in future warfare. Interestingly, by the late 1920s this discussion was al-
ready taking form around ideas which transposed the tank into normal cavalry doctrine, 
as seen in the “Purple Primer,” a tactical document which explicitly stated the possibili-
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ties of utilizing tank formations to do the work of horsed cavalry.85 This document also 
included tactical formations designed specifically with flanking maneuvers in mind. Rob-
ert Larson describes this order of battle: “In essence, these formations consisted of a for-
ward element that conducted reconnaissance and pinned the enemy to his position once 
he was located, and a shock element that maneuvered around an enemy so fixed and 
struck him from an unexpected quarter.”86 These tactics were almost identical to those 
used at Beersheba, with the XX Corps’ infantry playing the role of the fixing force and 
the 4th ALH acting as the flanking strike force.  
This basic theme was to continue throughout the interwar years, as British armor 
theory began to solidify behind a core of tactical doctrines. Many factors influenced this 
process, one of which was a British tendency to carry over tactics learned from peripheral 
conflicts in the British Empire.87 This included the Palestine Campaign, which some mili-
tary leaders saw as an answer to the problem of stagnation that had occurred in the trench 
warfare of the Western Front. The answer, according to this theory, was cavalry, which 
could be evolved according to the new opportunities of mechanized technology and util-
ized as it always had been, to disrupt and flank the enemy.88 This quickly became the set 
direction of the British military establishment, and a new Mobile Division was created 
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with the express purpose of converting old cavalry units into mechanized units, trading 
horses for light tanks but keeping tactics and doctrine almost intact.89 J.P. Harris argues 
that this was detrimental to the overall utility of this force, as  
The Mobile Division was seen too much as a direct replacement for the old horsed 
cavalry division. Most of its proposed functions: reconnaissance, the seizing of vi-
tal ground ahead of the rest of the Field Force, the protection of an exposed flank 
and maneuver against an enemy flank were old cavalry division roles...Indeed the 
division's composition as provisionally laid out in papers of 1934 and 1935 seems 
to have been designed more to find roles for otherwise redundant cavalry regi-
ments than to create the most potent possible fighting force.90 
 
In short, the Mobile Division became a replacement for forces such as the Australian 
Light Horse and mimicked in many ways their tactics of mobile flanking strikes. The idea 
of light tanks acting as a direct replacement for cavalry became a basic assumption to the 
British military command, and in many ways dominated the construction of their new 
armored units.91 
Importantly, this evolution of tactical doctrine was not a total consensus, and in 
many ways left some of its original theorists behind, including Fuller and Liddell Hart, 
who had argued for the importance of the tank in warfare but reached differing conclu-
sions in some respects than those adopted by the general staff.92 Several factors contrib-
uted to the evolution which resulted in a British armored force that was largely composed 
of light tanks utilizing cavalry tactics. One was the phenomenon described by W. Mi-
chael Ryan, in which British commanders stationed on the frontier, often undersupplied 
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and engaged in atypical forms of warfare, applied tactics of mobility which they had 
found effective to the new armored tactical doctrines developed between the World Wars. 
As a result, the new British light tanks were impractically light, both in armor and fire-
power, reflecting a fascination with mobility and speed.93 Another major factor was eco-
nomic constraints, which led the British to favor cheaper tank designs and severely re-
stricted their production ability, resulting in slimmed down cavalry-style striking forces.94 
Harold Winton argues for a focus on “imperial defense” similar to Ryan’s theories as 
well as a general “military conservatism” as primary factors in the creation of cavalry-
based armor units. This conservatism led British leaders to attempt to translate their cav-
alry units and tactics into an armored context, rather than respond with openness to inno-
vation in a new field.95 
 All of these factors were involved in a military policy that attempted to translate 
the successes of the peripheral campaigns of World War I into tactical doctrines. The 
problem with these theories was that they failed to take into account the fact that the ALH 
and similar units had succeeded, in part, because of a uniquely perfect set of conditions 
that might even be termed anachronistic relative to the general direction modern warfare 
was taking. The British had faced an inexperienced and poorly prepared Turkish force, 
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without reinforcements, in open terrain perfectly suited to cavalry maneuver; in short, 
conditions quite unlike what they would encounter against German forces in World War 
II. Regardless, the British high command had their recipe for tank warfare, and they con-
tinued to place trust in it throughout the interwar years and into the coming conflict.  
While it would definitely be overstatement to trace the genesis of interwar and 
World War II British tank doctrine directly and solely to Beersheba, it also seems clear 
that the events of the Palestine campaign had an impact, especially when combined with 
the preexisting British tactical tendencies that Ryan points out. Jean Bou notes that “The 
charge at Beersheba...was but one of a rapid series of events that pointed to the continued 
tactical utility of sensibly executed shock tactics carried out under the right circum-
stances.”96 Perhaps it was the very unexpected and heroic character of the ALH’s actions 
through the campaign that turned the prevailing doctrines on their head; after all, Bou re-
cords that when “...in late 1914 the 4th Light Horse Brigade had charged Australian In-
fantry in training...umpires declared that it had suffered nearly 100 percent casualties 
from machine gun fire.”97 When Beersheba displayed a totally different result for the 
same tactic, it may have led tacticians to overlook the mitigating circumstances that had 
allowed for such a surprising result. 
The shortsightedness of these strategic and tactical decisions would become clear 
when the British began to deploy their new light tank units at the beginning of World 
War II. Having developed the flanking maneuver, prominently utilized at Beersheba, into 
a complete order of battle, the British deployed specialized armored units made up of 
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light tanks accompanied by “pivot” units of infantry designed to fix the enemy while the 
tanks looped around for the knockout blow.98 However, these units were not effective 
against the German tank units, more heavily armed and armored and thus able to with-
stand anything the British tanks could bring to bear.99 Indeed, the only theater in which 
these units met with success was Africa, where the British faced the Italians, another 
poorly trained and prepared army, in a theater of operations that “...was essentially a 
scaled-up version of Ottoman Palestine.”100 However, even under ideal conditions, this 
success did not last long, as the Germans quickly developed and deployed countermea-
sure units to intercept and break up the British flanking squads.101 Failing to correctly in-
terpret the causes of their success in Palestine, British military theorists had thrown all of 
their efforts into a carefully devised system that was unable to meet the new challenges of 
rapidly evolving modern war. Ryan states that “...The very phenomenon which had pro-
duced mobile warfare therefore placed Britain at a tactical disadvantage during the Sec-
ond World War.”102 This disadvantage would continue to show itself as the British flank-
ing column succumbed to the German blitzkrieg.  
The Battle of Beersheba acted as the wedge that cracked open the Ottoman line in 
Palestine, and the events surrounding the battle and the storied charge of the 4th Austra-
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lian Light Horse had significant ramifications concerning later British tactical theory. It is 
important to remember, of course, that this battle alone neither won the campaign nor 
single-handedly rewrote the British Army’s tactical doctrine. However, as pointed out by 
scholars such as W. Michael Ryan, the British Army did have a preexisting tendency to 
romanticize the techniques and strategy of frontier conflicts, which they attempted to 
translate into rules that did not necessarily apply well to European warfare.103 The suc-
cess of traditional cavalry, utilized as light shock troops rather than mounted infantry, in 
Palestine was an influential event in a relatively unimportant campaign. The British 
would not realize until the opening days of WWII that the charge of the Australians at 
Beersheba had been a glorious anachronism, a charge into the sunset of a bygone era ra-
ther than into a new tactical dawn. 
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